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2Introduction
? Security and privacy research topics of 
importance to future mobile systems are 
reviewed.
? This is inevitably a very personal view 
(apologies for obvious omissions).
3Research themes
? There are two major themes running through 
this presentation:
– Mobile system security/privacy.  There are many 
well-known problems here, particularly in ubiquitous 
/ pervasive / ad hoc computing scenarios.
– Applications of trusted computing: It is possible 
(likely?) that the existence of trusted functionality on 
future mobile platforms will help to solve many 
apparently intractable security and privacy problems 
in the mobile world.
41.  Mobile systems privacy
? Many of the (mobile) devices providing the 
future ubiquitous environment will be personal 
devices; they may thus ‘leak’ personal 
information to each other.
? In a context where devices cannot be assumed 
to belong to a single trusted domain, there are 
thus major privacy issues.
5Interrogation of mobile devices
? Communications protocols for mobile devices 
inevitably require some form of routine ‘polling’.
? Responses to polls (e.g. from a network access point) 
need to contains some kind of identifier, e.g. a network 
address.
? Thus can be used to ‘track’ devices, and potentially 
track the location of device owners.
? Possible solutions? GSM/3GPP use temporary 
identifiers (pseudonyms) distributed in a way that 
prevents linking.  Provide confidentiality protection for 
exchange.
6Use and abuse of authentication
? Authentication of a device can pose a denial of 
service threat.
? For example, if protocol requires one device to 
store state and/or do computations, repeated 
fake requests can cause memory/processing 
exhaustion.
? Possible solutions? Use stateless protocols.  
Require requester to do at least as much work 
as the responder.
7Location information use/privacy
? Service providers in a ubiquitous computing 
environments may wish to provide services based on 
user location, e.g. targeted advertising, emergency 
services, broadcast blackout, …
? Owner of computing device may wish to restrict 
dissemination of such location information.
? How should this be controlled?
? Possible solutions? Anonymity.  Mandatory inclusion 
of policy data with location information.  TTPs.
8Denial of Service versus privacy
? In any protocol it seems that one party has to reveal 
their identity first.  This argues that (mostly) the 
requester of service should reveal their ID last.  (P2P 
an exception?)
? However, this potentially increases the risk of Denial of 
Service attacks against the responder.
? Indeed, more generally, the tension between DoS-
resistance and user privacy has been noted by a 
number of authors.
? Possible solutions? New ideas needed?
9Accountability versus privacy
? Anonymity to protect privacy may cause major 
problems in making users accountable for their 
actions.
? An audit trail (present to provide accountability) 
is useless if the real owner of a pseudonym 
cannot be determined.
? Possible solutions? New ideas needed?
10
2.  Mobile systems security
? There are a huge range of new challenging 
issues which arise from the use of mobile 
devices making up part of a pervasive 
computing environment.
? We touch on just a few…
11
Ad hoc working relationships
? Major issues exist in establishing ad hoc 
working relationships between mobile devices 
(in absence of pre-existing security 
infrastructure).
? Initial trust setting is a major issue.
? Desire for zero or near zero configuration 
overhead – automatic security initialisation is 
required.
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Automatic address assignment
? In an ad hoc network, newly admitted devices 
will typically need to be assigned a network 
address (or addresses).
? In the absence of a fixed infrastructure this is 
problematic.
? Solutions can easily lead to the possibility of 
denial of service attacks.
? Just one part of ‘zero-config’ problem.
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Routing in ad hoc networks
? Many protocols designed to enable distributed 
routing in ad hoc environment.
? However, such schemes are prone to a variety 
of attacks, including ‘selfish’ behaviour.
? Protocols are needed which can address a 
variety of possible security threats without 
requiring a global security infrastructure.
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Location of security functionality
? Where security functionality is located in a 
protocol stack can have a significant effect on 
security provision, including:
– Encrypting at the application layer will not hide any 
of the lower layer addresses and routing 
information.  May also cause problems for firewalls.
– Integrity protection at individual link level will not 
provide end-to-end integrity protection.
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End-to-end versus point-to-point
? Need for security between service provider and service 
consumer argues for end-to-end authentication.
? Need for control of access to resources, e.g. network 
access, argues for point-to-point authentication.
? If both provided in ‘unlinked’ way then man-in-the-
middle attacks can become possible.
? Great care needed in combining protocols at different 
levels in protocol hierarchy.
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Protocol statefulness
? As mentioned previously, protocol state can be 
used as a means of launching DoS attacks.
? ‘Accepted wisdom’ is to require protocols to be 
stateless, at least for responder.
? However, there is an efficiency cost (state must 
be shipped in protocol messages).  It also 
either requires synchronised clocks or regular 
key changes (a bit like state).
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Key management and security 
infrastructure issues
? Use of crypto requires either shared secret 
keys (using symmetric crypto) or trusted copies 
of public keys (using asymmetric crypto).
? Shared secrets can be set up via a mutually 
trusted TTP.
? Public keys can be obtained via public key 
certificates as part of a PKI, although trusted 
means to verify certificates (CA public keys) 
required.
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Heterogeneous networks
? The pair of devices may not share an online TTP (or 
even share ‘trust-connected’ TTPs).
? Public key crypto (and PKI) looks more promising, but 
it is still necessary to have mutually verifiable 
certificates.  Finding certification paths (where one CA 
certifies the public key of another CA) could be 
infeasibly complex for a bandwidth-limited device.
? Possible solutions? Delegated Path 
Discovery/Delegated Path Validation.
19
PKI interoperability
? Finding a certification path is by no means only 
problem with using PKI.
? Certificates issued by different CAs (with 
different policies) may ‘mean’ different things –
e.g. different liability protection, different ID 
checking for certificate issue, etc.
? Certificate status management systems may 
vary. 
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ID-based cryptography
? One possible solution to key management 
problems is used of ID-based crypto.
? Here a user public key is derivable from a user 
identifier (possibly plus other data).
? Requires TTP to issue private keys (and TTP 
public parameters to derive public key from ID).
? Hence we have major interoperation issues if 
two devices served by different TTPs.
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Mobile code security
? Mobile code, i.e. executable code which is 
downloaded from one device to another, has 
obvious associated security issues.
? Main issues are:
– Integrity of code itself;
– Authentication of origin of code;
– Authorisation of code.
? Other issues:
– Code confidentiality;
– Intellectual property issues.
22
3.  Use of trusted computing
? We conclude this talk by mentioning a few 
areas where trusted computing technology 
might help to address some of the identified 
mobile security and privacy issues.
23
Trusted computing  I
? Trusted computing is hardware-based 
functionality in a computing platform that:
? (a) provides a hardware (cryptographic) basis 
of trust for system boot, integrity verification of 
applications, etc.
? (b) provides a means for an external third party 
to verify the current state of a platform.
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Trusted computing  II
? Considerable resources are currently being devoted to 
both hardware and software to support trusted 
computing (tc) technology.
? A number of vendors have produced TPMs (Trusted 
Platform Modules) conformant to the TCG (Trusted 
Computing Group) specifications.
? PCs incorporating TPMs are now widely available.
? Meanwhile operating system vendors and providers, 
including Microsoft and the open source community 
are working on operating systems exploiting this 
functionality.
25
Applications of tc
? There seem almost endless possible ways in 
which tc technology could be used to improve 
application security and privacy.
? The mobile world seems a natural environment 
in which some of the tc features can be 
exploited.
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TC based stable identities
? A  major problem in scenarios lacking security 
infrastructure is Sybil problem (entity claims 
multiple addresses) – e.g. in p2p and ad hoc 
settings.
? Trusted computing may be able to help by 
using the DAA protocol in a way which enables 
all actions of a particular platform to be linked, 
while not revealing true identity of that platform.
27
TC based trusted download  I
? Problem arises in the context of broadcast to a 
mobile device.
? The established standard security techniques, 
e.g. involving use of broadcaster-specific smart 
cards in set-top boxes, is not really appropriate 
for a mobile model.
28
TC based trusted download  II
? Use of a mobile platform for receiving broadcast 
content seems to mandate a software solution.
? However, the conditional access application needs to 
be protected.
? Conventional operating systems cannot provide the 
needed protection without a hardware token.
? Trusted computing can provide all the necessary 
guarantees.
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TC based identity management  I
? A range of different single sign-on (SSO) 
technologies exist.
? In a true SSO system, a user authenticates 
once to an Identity Service Provider (ISP), and 
this ISP then vouches for the identity of the 
user to multiple Service Providers (SPs).
30
TC based identity management  II
? Clearly, the SP must trust the ISP to tell the 
truth about who has been authenticated and 
how.
? Typically this means that the ISP must be a 
networked entity remote to the user.
? The use of tc technology enables the ISP to be 
implemented on the user platform, in such a 
way that the SP can verify its trustworthiness.
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TC based PI management  I
? A growing number of possibilities now exist for Internet 
SPs to offer services tailored to end users.
? However, this possibility also represents a privacy 
threat, since the SP will typically need to know 
potentially privacy-breaching information about an end 
user in order to provide the tailored service.
? One key example (relevant in a mobile context) is the 
use of location information.
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TC based PI management  II
? How does owner of PI prevent it being disseminated 
and used in unauthorised ways?
? It is possible that tc can help.
? The holder of PI, and associated policy information 
(e.g. defining user preferences), can use tc
functionality to check out the platform requesting PI, 
before sending it.
? This check could involve verifying the type of recipient 
platform and the identity of the receiving application.
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TC-based co-operation enforcement
? The support of MANETs typically requires co-operation 
by the nodes, e.g. to support routing.
? Malicious users may replace their network software 
with a ‘selfish’ version, e.g. to save battery power.
? TC could help guarantee that a network element is 
running the ‘correct’ software, and hence will not 
behave selfishly.
? (Of course, this requires the communications hardware 
to be part of the TC subsystem.)
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TC-based type approval
? The spread of computers everywhere (cars, fridges, 
toasters, …) gives rise to major problems regarding 
safety.
? For example, a car owner could replace the engine 
management software to radically increase engine 
power.  See also SDR.
? Not only will this potentially wreck the engine, it may 
also be a major safety problem, since the 
brakes/suspension won’t match performance.
? Traditional solution is a closed environment which will 
only run authorised software – however the trend is to 
open platforms everywhere, and TC may help give 
back control.
